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 MAJORITY RULE VOTING GAMES
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 Political Science Department
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 Political Science Department
 Carnegie Mellon University
 In the context of spatial majority voting games, considerable experimental support
 exists for the core as a solution hypothesis when it is not empty (Berl et al., 1976; Fiorina
 and Plott, 1978; Isaacs and Plott, 1978). Specifically, these experiments show that if a
 simple majority voting game possesses a Core point-a point that cannot be defeated by a
 majority vote-subjects choose outcomes at or near this point. In this article, however, we
 present some additional experimental evidence to suggest that committee choice in simple
 majority rule games is not dictated solely by whether or not the core is nonempty. We con-
 clude that, in the experimental context of open and free discussion, the performance of the
 core may be affected by the structure of the alternative space, and by factors that seem
 irrelevant to the theory, such as the structure of the dominance relation underlying the
 core in the social ordering.
 OVERVIEW
 The first section of this article reviews the results of some vote trading
 experiments in which the core does not predict the outcomes as well as in
 the previous studies and describes a further series of experiments that
 appear to resolve the question of why the core performed poorly there.
 The second section presents an additional series of majority voting
 games with a relatively uncomplicated structure in which the cores
 success rate is about 60%. The final section summarizes our alternative
 explanations of the core's failures but concludes that an adequate theory
 for incorporating such considerations is not available currently.
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 VOTE TRADING GAMES
 In an earlier study (1979a) we described the experimental outcomes
 of several vote trading games with and without cores. Briefly, in those
 games subjects are given a list of "bills" (usually 5) and told that, by
 majority rule, they must decide which bills to pass and which to fail. If a
 bill is failed, they receive a payoff of zero from that bill; if a bill is passed,
 their payoff (in dollars) is either positive or negative, depending on the
 value assigned to them for that bill. Payoffs, then, are additive across
 bills. That is, a subject's final payment is determined by the committee's
 action on bill A, plus its action on bill B, and so on, so that no
 multiplicative or interactive payoffs occur.
 The rules of the experiment allow the subjects to establish their own
 methods of disposing the bills. They can consider the bills sequentially
 or simultaneously as a package. Whenever a majority arrives at an
 agreement on some subset of the bills, they can enforce that agreement
 by signing an agreement card on those bills. They cannot, however,
 reconsider decisions that have already been made. Subjects have ordinal
 information about other subjects' payoffs. Specifically, they know
 which bills each other player prefers to pass and to fail. They neither
 know nor are permitted to communicate the magnitude of their payoffs
 or to make any mention of money. In this way, trading can occur only
 over bills and not over any numeraire such as money.
 Table 1 portrays a vote trading game with a core (corresponding to
 passing only bills C and E, denoted "CE"). Payoffs for a given
 individual, across bills, are additive, so that at the core the payoff vector
 (10, 1, 13, 5, -8) results. ' This game is then modified in three ways. First,
 the payoffs of each player on bills C and E are multiplied by -1 so that
 the core is the more "obvious" outcome, "O"-that is, all bills fail.2
 Second, the apparent vote trade between players 1 and 2 on bills A and
 B-a trade that leads away from the core-is eliminated by decreasing
 1. Subjects are given an endowment to cover possible losses. Subjects do not know the
 magnitude of their endowment during the negotiations; they only know it is a predeter-
 mined fixed amount that will be revealed to them at the termination of the experiment.
 Further details on the exact experimental design can be found in McKelvey and Ordeshook
 (1980).
 2. The table for this modification is the same as Table 1, except that the entries in
 columns C and E would have their signs reversed to read -5, -5, -5,3,4 and -5,4, -8, -8,4,
 respectively.
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 TABLE 1
 payoffs for a Core Experiment (Core = CE)
 Bills
 Player A B C D) F
 1 10 -2 5 4 5
 2 --2 10 5 -5 -4
 3 4 -8 5 3 8
 4 --8 4 ---3 -5 8
 5 -5 --5 --4 --1() 4
 NOTI: IEntries denote payoff if bill is passed.
 l's payoff from the passage of bill B to -12.3 Third, various payoffs are
 adjusted to eliminate weak preferences around the core.4 Table 2
 summarizes the results of the experiments run with the original design as
 well as under the three modifications. Overall, we see that the core's
 success rate is only 45% and that the various modifications of the
 original game yield only modest changes in the core's success.
 One possible explanation of the above results is that it is the separable
 structure of the alternative space and the corresponding ability to make
 decisions on only some bills that leads to outcomes away from the core.
 Thus, in the experiment of Table 1, the final alternative space is actually
 a cartesian product space (that is, of the form 10, 1t 5) consisting of
 exactly 2s = 32 possible outcomes, where each final alternative is a
 particular disposition of each of the five bills. Because of the size of this
 set, subjects frequently attempt to disaggregate the decision by making
 agreements on only a subset of the bills. In the actual experiments, this
 may be done either for strategic reasons-a player realizes he or she can
 do better by disaggregation-or to simplify the group's decision task. A
 sequential disposition can be implemented by making the decision
 sequentially, or it may occur through verbal commitments made and
 adhered to in the negotiations, with final decisions being on all bills
 simultaneously. We know, of course, that such sequential vote trading
 can lead not only to noncore outcomes but also occasionally to Pareto
 inferior outcomes (see Riker and Brams, 1976). Our initial hypothesis,
 3. The table for this modification is the same as Table 1, except that the entry for
 player 1, column B, reads -12 instead of -2.
 4. Referring to Table 1, the changes are: for players 3, increase payoff on bill C from 5
 to 10; for player 4, decrease payoff on bill B to 3; for player 5, increase payoffs on C and E
 to -3.
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 TABLE 2
 Success Rate of the Core*
 Indifference Vote Trade
 Original Gaine Modification Modification A11
 2 5 3 10)
 Core = -
 7 7 7 21
 2 4 3 9
 Core = Cl - - -
 7 7 7 21
 4 9 6 19
 All -
 14 14 14 42
 *Numnerator is number of core outcomes, denominator is number of trials.
 then, is that the deviations from the core reported in Table 2 can be
 attributed to this separability of the alternative space and to the
 corresponding ability to make sequential decisions over subsets of the
 alternative space.
 To explore this hypothesis we can construct a new experimental
 design. Specifically, with 5 bills there are 32 possible outcomes.
 Eliminating six outcomes that, a priori, are unlikely to be chosen (are
 Pareto dominated) and which occur infrequently in the bargaining, we
 can label the remaining 26 outcomes A through Z. Each letter, then,
 corresponds to a particular disposition of all five bills, while each
 player's preference across these alternatives is deduced from Table 1.
 The resulting preference configuration is given in Table 3 (see Appendix
 A for the actual payoff schedules used and for the transformation
 relating the lettered alternatives of Table 3 to the bills of Table 1).
 To conduct the appropriate experiment using the preference orders in
 this table, we provide each player with these ordinal rankings and use
 procedures and instructions that require subjects to use majority rule to
 choose one and only one alternative (letter). Again, each subject is told
 of the ordinal rankings of the other subjects but not of the payoff
 magnitudes. (A detailed description of the experimental design of these
 "finite alternative" games can be found in McKelvey and Ordeshook,
 1 979a.)
 We see from Table 4 that once forced to consider complete packages,
 the core prevails every time. It appears, then, that the results reported in
 Table 2 have a straightforward explanation. In the first experimental
 design, the ability and the apparent willingness of subjects to simplify
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 TAB3LF 3
 Finite Alternative, Experiment
 Core = G
 Player I Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
 X Y X J V
 H U I N W,T
 E N M W LP
 F; ,L,S Q z G
 B B G, (G Y,J,1,0
 1,0 J,R F,(,H K,L,R C
 M T A A L,N
 K,U H,K B3,1 B,Y A,D,U,K
 R I l),R,W M,O,V B,M
 G,P (G,Z N,T Tl SZI,(Q
 D,A D,V l',K S,H R,X
 N E Z,C CQ II
 S,z I,P Li Li
 T,W M,W J,V,S 1),l',X
 C C Y I
 J,Y O,X L 1:
 V A
 L Q
 NOTE: Preferences of players ranked from best to worst.
 TABLE 4
 Outcomes of Finite Alternative Experiment Fl
 Outcome Coalition
 Core 12345
 (lore 345
 Core 345
 Core 12345
 Core 1345
 Core 1345
 (lore 1 345
 the decision task by making agreements on subsets of the bills as
 opposed to agreements on a complete disposition of all bills simulta-
 neously leads away from the core.
 Of course, from the point of view of cooperative game theory, there is
 no reason the two experimental designs should yield different outcomes.
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 The characteristic function of both is the same, and under the first
 design, those individuals who are not benefiting from sequential
 disposal of the bills should not enter into such agreements and should
 hold out for the core. Nevertheless, the second design, by precluding this
 sequential disposition, forces outcomes toward the core.
 SOME ADDITIONAL AMBIGUITIES
 Note that in Table 3 the core (alternative G) stands at about the
 median of player I and 2's preference orders and distinctly above the
 median for players 3, 4, and 5. If subjects make interpersonal
 comparisons of utility based on the position of an alternative in the
 ordering, then the core appears to be a relatively "fair" outcome.
 The experiments reported in this section were originally designed to
 attempt to verify, in a finite alternative setting, that the choice of the core
 point is independent of its "fairness" properties. This has already been
 investigated in experiments where the alternative space has a spatial
 representation (see Berl et al., 1976, and Fiorina and Plott, 1978, where
 the core predicts well even in situations where it is one player's ideal point
 and close to bottom for others). We initially expected the same results to
 hold here.
 To address the issue of fairness, consider the experiment shown in
 Table 5, which has a nonempty core, alternative A. Note that A is "low"
 on some preference schedules (players 1 and 4) and is player 3's ideal
 point. In contrast to the game in Table 3, then, the core here varies more
 greatly over preference schedules. Since subjects typically use the
 relative location of an alternative as a proxy for utility comparisons
 when raising equity arguments (recall that they do not know the specific
 dollar payoffs of other subjects), the core here should seem less fair than
 in the previous experiment. In addition, to control for any visual clues
 that relative position might engender, we conducted two versions of this
 experiment. In the first, subjects are provided with complete ordinal
 information about everyone's preferences, while in the second, they are
 given no information on other subjects' preferences. Table 6 summarizes
 the results of 30 trials of this game, controlling also for the experience of
 the subjects.
 The results of these experiments provide a weaker support for the
 core than is provided by previous experimental work. Overall, the core
 occurs in only 60% of the trials. The data also show two additional
 patterns.
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 TABLE1 5
 Finite Alternative Experiment
 Core= A
 Player I Player 2 Player 3 Pla per 4 Player 5
 J K A L 1
 II1) 13 K J
 1) 1 iF G B3
 (7 A I ( 11
 L G I) I A
 B C G IF N
 I 11 I 1I G
 G F I M L
 N B II A (
 M J K B 1)
 A I J 1 1;
 1' I 1, 1) I
 II N NI N K
 K i  J m
 NOTE: P'references of players ranked from best to worst.
 TAB1LE' 6
 RCesults of Experimlent F2
 Complete Ordital Ifjormnlatioi Incomnple te Or-dinal Infortnmation
 "'xperienced Inext'f)(ienleed LExperiened Inexp)et'ieCed
 sujects subjects subjects subjects
 1 (1,2,3) 13 (1,3,4,5) A (2,3,5) A (3,4,5)
 A (2,3,5) A (2,3,5) A (2,3,4,5) A (1,2,3,5)
 1F (1,2,3) A (1,2,3,4,5) 1' (2,3,4,5) A (2,3,4,5)
 A (2,3,4,5) A (3,4,5) A (2,3,4,5) 1F (1 ,2,3)
 E (1,2,3) G (2,3,4,5) 1' (3,4,5) A (2,3,4,5)
 A (3,4,5) F' (1,2,3) A (2,3,4,5 ) A (2,3,4)
 1`; (1,2,3) 1< (1,2,3) A (2,3,4,5) A (1,2,3,4,5)
 13 (1,3,5)
 A (2,3,4,5)
 % of
 Outcomes 43% 43%' 67% 86%
 in C'ore
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 TABLE 7
 Results of Experiment F2 with Preference Schedules Reversed
 Outcome Coalition
 A (2,3,4,5)
 A (2,3,5)
 A (2,3,4,5)
 C (1,2,3,4)
 E (1,3,4)
 E (1,3,4)
 E (1,3,4)
 A (1,2,3,4,5)
 % of Outcomes 50%
 in Core
 (1) Incomplete ordinal information about the preferences of other players leads to a
 higher success rate for the core.
 (2) While the relationship is weak and statistically insignificant, in the incomplete in-
 formation games inexperienced subjects appear more likely to choose the core
 than experienced subjects.
 Despite the fact that the core does not predict well in these 3 experi-
 ments, deviations from the core do not seem to be explainable by
 consideration of fairness. Seven of the 12 failures correspond to the
 choice of alternative E, which benefits three subjects (subjects 1, 2, and
 3) at the expense of the other two. Examination of the remaining failures
 shows that at most three failures (one G and perhaps the two Bs) might
 be classified as "fair." Thus, there must be some other explanation for
 the above results.
 Before we attempt to interpret these results more fully, however, we
 can dismiss one simple explanation for the core's failures. Specifically,
 note that E is "good" for three adjacent players, 1, 2, and 3. We must
 consider the possibility, then, that E is chosen simply because its
 acceptability to a majority is more apparent on the payoff schedules.
 Note, in fact, that the frequency of E declines appreciably when this
 visual clue is absent-when players possess incomplete ordinal informa-
 tion about others' preferences. Table 7 reports a series of trials in which
 player 2 is given player 4's preference order, and conversely, thus
 making E less "prominent."
 These results are somewhat equivocal. The relative frequency of E
 decreases, but still occurs three times out of the eight trials. The core
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 succeeds 50% of the time versus 43% of the time in the previous
 experiments. None of these differences, however, is significant. Hence,
 we conclude that, even if there is a "visual effect," it is not the
 explanation for the failures of the core that we report here.
 A more convincing explanation for our experimental results con-
 cerns the specific dominance structure of each experiment. First, with
 respect to the game in Table 3, for which the core prevails in every trial,
 we note that if we exclude the core, the dominance relation among the
 remaining alternatives contains a cycle including every alternative. That
 is, if the core G is eliminated, the new top cycle set corresponds to the
 entire set of alternatives. Appendix B, on the other hand, gives the
 dominance matrix for Experiment F2, which is illustrated in Figure 1.
 Note that A, the core point, is followed by a six-element cycle set
 consisting of EB,C,G,D,F , which in turn is followed by a five-element
 cycle set consisting of H,I,J,K,L . These all beat N, which in turn beats
 the Condorcet loser, M. In contrast to the game in Table 3 the preference
 portrayed in Table 5 yields a considerably smaller top cycle set beneath
 the core.
 There are several additional things to note about the dominance
 structure of Figure 1. First, in the top cycle set below A, E is beaten only
 by B and, of course, A. Thus, E is stable against any other alternative
 except these two. Further, both B and A beat E by only three votes and
 require the support of exactly the same coalition to support a change.
 This relative stability of E is probably enhanced by the fact that the
 coalition that must support a change to A or B-namely 3, 4, 5 , is not
 the most obvious coalition to support these proposals. The coalition
 includes the one player-namely player 4, for whom A or B are "low" on
 his ordering and are not very much better than E. A first glance at the
 payoff schedules of Table 5 suggests that a more natural supporting
 coalition for A is 2, 3, 5 . In fact, when A actually occurs, it frequently is
 supported by player 2 (see Table 6).
 The above considerations argue that in some sense E is stable, and it is
 difficult to move from E to the core A. Moreover, further inspection of
 the dominance structure for this game reveals that, with the exception of
 alternative N, A beats each alternative by only three votes, and player 2
 is always one of the three who must support a change to A. Thus, to get
 to A from any other point in the space (except N), player 3 must support
 the move. While it might seem that it is always in player 3's interest to
 support such a move, this is true only if player 3 is aware that this
 proposal is stable. If player 3 suspects that A is not stable, then by
 proposing a move to A he runs the potential risk of sacrificing whatever
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 Figure 1: Dominance Structure of Experiment F2
 he may be making from the prevailing proposal. If, for example, the
 prevailing proposal is E, the gain can be fairly small (see Appendix A).
 The preceding arguments suggest that the dominance structure in
 Experiment F2 accounts for the core failures. It creates a dominance
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 TABLE 8
 Distribution of Core Failures Over Top Cycle Below A
 (')u tCOtIfC
 F /5 C CG D F'
 Frequency 7 2 1 0 2
 Vulnerability* 2 3 4 4 4 4
 *Vulnerability = number of proposals that are preferred by at least one majority
 coalition to the given proposal.
 pattern that provides some stability to E, and that makes it necessary to
 have player 3's support to obtain the core outcome. Given the fact that
 there are cycles below the core, a weak or timid player 3 may assume that
 A is also unstable and hence be unwilling to push for it. The result is that
 the outcomes will tend to be distributed in the top cycle below the core,
 rather than at the core.
 If we consider the core failures, we note that they are, in fact, all in the
 top cycle below the core, distributed roughly in accordance with the
 vulnerability of these proposals (see Table 8).
 The preceding explanation also appears to account for the differences
 we observe due to information and experience. The effect of incomplete
 information seems to be that subjects are then forced to internalize the
 relevant preferences of other players and, in doing so, learn better the
 dominance relations in the game. They are also forced to consider all
 alternatives in the process of collecting information and do not have the
 visual signal of alternative E being "high" on the list for a majority.
 The second pattern may be attributed to the fact that experienced
 players expect cycles and instability-based on having played unstable
 games earlier-and, as a result, assume that every alternative can be
 beaten by another. What we frequently observe, in fact, is that subjects
 enter the cycle just beneath the core and, once there, fail to consider any
 additional alternatives. Rather than attempting to break the cycle, they
 attempt to negotiate the most advantageous outcomes in it.
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 CONCLUSIONS
 This article reports on 37 experimental trials of several finite
 alternative games with a core, in addition to reviewing 42 vote trading
 core games. In the vote trading games, the core prevails 45% of the time.
 In the "finite alternative" games, the core prevails 60% of the time. This
 summary figure, however, disguises much interesting variation. First,
 two distinct finite alternative games are considered: In one-the game
 that is equivalent in terms of its abstract dominance structure to the vote
 trading game-the core prevails 100% of the time, while in the other, the
 core prevails only 57% of the time. Second, in the latter game, the core's
 success rate is 52% with experienced subjects and 64% with inexperi-
 enced players. Finally, with complete ordinal preference information,
 the core is chosen 43% of the time in the second game, whereas with
 incomplete information this rate increases to 75%.
 We conclude that there are at least two reasons for the departures
 from the core: complexity of the alternative space and structure of the
 dominance relation. Unfortunately, although the above explanations
 seem to account for the deviations observed here, these are ad hoc
 explanations generated from the particular problems seen in these two
 games. Since there is no theory that incorporates such considerations,
 there is no way of ascertaining a priori whether these factors are relevant
 in a given experiment, and, if so, exactly how they will affect the
 outcome. Further, we do not know if there are other reasons for
 departures from the core that would become more apparent in other
 experimental designs. In short, we must conclude that the extent to
 which the core is a reasonable prediction about choice depends on many
 factors that we have not yet begun to understand or appreciate fully.
 APPENDIX A
 This appendix contains payoff schedules for the experiments por-
 trayed in Tables 3 and 5, as well as the transformation relating the game
 in Table 3 to the two vote trading experiments. The following list gives
 that transformation. In this list, the first entry in each row represents the
 alternative in the game of Table 3, the second and third entries represent
 the corresponding alternatives in the two versions of the vote trading
 experiments. The first vote trading experiment is that in Table 1, with
 Core = CE. The second is the equivalent vote trading experiment de-
 scribed in the text with Core = A.
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 A - D1, - (C1) N - BCE - B
 B- ABCL AB 0 --AL -AC
 C D CDE P -A -ACE
 D -C) -DEL Q ADE - ACD
 -- ACE A R BCDE BD
 l - ACD ADE, S 1- 3CD -- BDE'
 Core: G - CE -a T -- C -- E
 1 - A13CD -- ABD U ABC ABI3
 I -AC -AL V -- --Cl
 J 13 - I3BC W E C
 K - ABE' -- A13C X - ACI)D E - AD
 1, -1 B - BCE Y BC - BE
 M -- Cl)E, - 1) Z - 1DE *- BCD
 Table AI gives the payoff schedules for the experiment in Table 3. In
 each such experiment, the actual schedule used for each subject is drawn
 randomly from the three payoff schedules portrayed in Table Al for
 each player. The initial endowment (whose magnitude is unknown to
 the subject until termination of the experiment) for each version of the
 payoff schedule is given as in the bottom row of the table. For ex-
 ample, then, if the core, G, is chosen, player l's payoff with schedule
 #2 is 20 (since G is tenth from the top) minus 17 (that player'sX -
 value with schedule #2), or $3.00.
 The payoff schedules for the experiment in Table 5, described in
 Table A2, are generated using the same procedures as those in McKelvey
 and Ordeshook (1979). Again, in each trial for each subject, one payoff
 schedule is drawn randomly from the three schedules listed.
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 APPENDIX B
 Dominance Matrix for Experiment F2
 A B C D f F G If I J K 1 M N I{(x) 1(x)
 A 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0
 B 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 3 3
 C 3 2 3 3 2 4 1 0 2 2 2 0 1 4 4
 I) 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 4
 E 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 2
 i 3 2 3 2 3 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 4
 G 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 1 3 4
 H 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 4 8
 1 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 0 1 5 9
 J 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 4 9
 K 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 10
 L, 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 2 0 1 4 9
 M 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 3 5 13
 N 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 5 12
 Matrix of n(x,y) for I xperimnent 2.
 Key: n(x,y) = number of voters strictly preferring x to y
 n(x) = max n(x,y)
 y
 I (x) = number or alternatives defeating x
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